NPO Blog Archive

February 17, 2020 by Robert Franklin, JD, Member, National Board of Directors

Once more a man who’s not the father of a child has been forced to pay child support for it.  That’s true despite the fact that all parties acknowledge that the man isn’t the child’s father and he apparently has no relationship with it.  The case demonstrates the inanity and injustice of failing to require mothers to accurately identify the fathers of the children to which they give birth.

In April of 2017, Abriel Gonzalez gave birth to a child.  She named Jonathan Ortiz as the father even though she knew he might not be.  Ortiz too had questions about his paternity, but, at the hospital when the baby was born, Gonzalez threatened that, if he didn’t sign an affidavit acknowledging paternity, she wouldn’t allow him to see the child.  So he did.

That was a mistake on his part, because Indiana law states that, once such an affidavit is signed, it constitutes conclusive proof of paternity.  However, it can be challenged in court within 60 days of signing and afterward if the man’s signature was procured by “fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.”

Ortiz got DNA testing conducted that proved he isn’t the father, but Gonzalez insisted that he is.  He got a second test that produced the same results as the first, but again, Gonzalez claimed otherwise.  Finally, the state sought child support from Ortiz and he claimed non-paternity.  The trial court agreed with Ortiz, but the linked-to opinion by the Court of Appeals reversed that finding.

Why?  To begin with, the trial court found no fraud or duress, a fact I find to be very odd.  After all, Gonzalez knew to a certainty that Ortiz might not be the father, but never let on about the fact.  She knew that he was not the only man with whom she’d had intercourse near the time of conception, so she knew the other man might be the father.  The law is clear that the refusal to disclose a fact that’s material to a “transaction” can be fraudulent.  Equally clear is that, when paternity is at issue, the refusal by Gonzalez to make the simple statement “I’m not sure who the father is; it could be Jonathan or it could be” the other man, is an omission of a material fact.  Ergo, fraud.

But the trial court didn’t agree and the issue wasn’t raised at the appellate level.

So what about material mistake of fact?  Ortiz signed the affidavit at the hospital relying on Gonzalez’ misrepresentation that he’s the father.  How is it then that the appellate court can find that to not be a mistake of fact?  Well, it did so by relying not on what Ortiz did at the hospital, but on what he did later.  Clearly, once he’d received the first set of genetic test results, Ortiz could have been under no illusion that he is the child’s father, a fact emphasized by the appellate court. 

But just as clearly, nothing he did after signing the affidavit has any bearing on his reasons for signing it.  There at the hospital, he didn’t know whether he’s the father or not.  He signed, believing – at least provisionally – Gonzalez’ misrepresentations.

The appellate court is plainly wrong in its conclusions.  Gonzalez should appeal.

As if to say “we’re not very sure that we’ve ruled correctly,” the court went on to claim something even more bizarre.

This Court has noted that in a situation like this one, where setting aside paternity would leave a child fatherless, then the child would be a “filius nullius,” meaning a “son of nobody.” In re Paternity of E.M.L.G., 863 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The paternity statute was “created to avoid such an outcome, which could carry with it countless ‘detrimental emotional and financial effect[s].’”

“Leave a child fatherless?”  Excuse me?  No, relieving Ortiz of the duty of supporting a child who’s not his would in no way leave it fatherless.  The child has a father.  All that’s required to bring him into the child’s life is for Gonzalez to name him.  He could then take up his parental rights and duties and the man who’s actually responsible for bringing the child into the world would be responsible for its support and care.  And the man who’s not, wouldn’t be.  In other words, the state would get the matters of paternity and child support right instead of wrong.  And the child would grow up knowing who its true father is, a fact that can be vital in making medical decisions.

As I’ve asked so often before, why is it up to men, who do not and cannot know all the material facts, to figure out paternity?  Why isn’t it women’s obligation to identify all possible fathers of a child?  If they did, then DNA testing could be conducted and the correct father identified from the outset.  Again, women know with whom they have sex, but any given man knows only that he had sex with the woman in question.  He doesn’t know who her other partners have been.

The law should place the obligation of disclosure where it properly belongs – on the woman.  She should be required to tell the truth about paternity and, if she’s not sure, say that.  No sound public policy tags as fathers men who aren’t.  This needs to change.

February 14, 2020 by Robert Franklin, JD, Member, National Board of Directors

It’s that time of year again in Florida.  Early Spring?  No, it’s the time when the legislature is in session, there are two bills that would reform alimony and parenting time law and, of course opposition to both from family lawyers.  Here’s one example from Amy Hamlin who’s president of the Family Law Section of the Florida State Bar (Florida Politics, 2/10/20).  We’ve been down this road in Florida many times before and, predictably, the family lawyers there have no new arguments to make in their desperation to head-off sensible reform.

Well, to be entirely accurate, Hamlin does have one new argument that comes in the subtitle to her piece.

Hasty changes to alimony reform won’t yield better results for Florida families.

“Hasty?”  Er, not exactly.  In fact, alimony reform and shared parenting are possibly the best-known, best-understood and most extensively vetted of any issue before the legislature.  That’s because they’ve been introduced as bills, heard by committees, argued to the full House and Senate and voted on for at least four years now.  That’s not what I call “hasty.”

Weirdly, Hamlin admits as much.

For the last several Legislative Sessions, there has a push for sweeping changes to Florida’s alimony statute…

So, according to the article, the effort is hasty and at the same time it’s been around for several years.  Make sense?  As it turns out, it makes about as much sense as the rest of Hamlin’s piece.

Predictably, Hamlin imagines a legal world few Floridians who’ve passed through it would recognize.  Indeed, if the comments to her piece are any indication, she’s entirely off-base.  For example, Hamlin wants to continue the system under which alimony payors can literally be paying on their deathbed.  Hamlin tells them not to worry because they can always pay a lawyer vast sums of money, go to court and pray that a judge who has almost complete discretion in the matter will give them a break.  Most people of course can’t afford to even try, meaning that their obligation to an ex-spouse, who can’t be bothered to give them the time of day, ends only with death. 

And those who can afford the legal bills often find that minor inconveniences like a serious illness or the desire to finally retire aren’t considered “changed circumstances” by His/Her Honor.  So the obligation to pay alimony not only can be permanent, it can deny the payor any semblance of a normal late life.

Perhaps most laughable is Hamlin’s plaint that the proposed reforms might not result in fair outcomes.  Nowhere does she mention the fact that the current system, about which she’s so enthusiastic, unquestionably does exactly that.  

Nor does Hamlin ever get around to saying what the bills would actually do.  Their whole point is to provide some sort of predictability to outcomes in alimony cases.  That is, if the bills become law, every divorcing person would know within reason what they would pay/receive and for how long.  They can then make sensible plans based on reasonable certainties.  As things stand now, it’s anyone’s guess.  No two judges are alike and all have extremely wide latitude about how they can rule.  It’s a crap shoot.

Amazing too is the fact that Hamlin betrays not the slightest awareness that we live in a time when men and women both do paid work and can support themselves.  Nowhere does she admit that the very concept of alimony is an artifact of days long gone by or that the spirit of independence and self-reliance demands that non-disabled adults should be required to fend for themselves.  Hamlin’s arguing for a system of law that assumed women to be helpless creatures incapable of seeing to their own needs.  That loony infantilization of women is not only factually false, but denigrating to the distaff half of society.

But alimony reform isn’t the only improvement to Florida law Hamlin opposes.  As a family attorney, she of course opposes equal parenting too.  And, as with alimony, she has nothing new to add to the threadbare arguments trotted out regularly by family lawyers everywhere.

Another troubling part of this proposed legislation is the presumption of equal timesharing, as a presumption of 50/50 timesharing wrongly assumes that all families are the same and should be treated the same.

No, actually it doesn’t.  Plus, as a lawyer, Hamlin surely knows it doesn’t.  What the bills would do is establish a presumption of equal parenting time.  But, as every lawyer knows, presumptions can be rebutted.  That gives judges the ability to order different parenting plans for different parents as the need arises.  Again, Hamlin knows this.  The fact that she pretends otherwise means but one thing – she has no real arguments to make against bills she doesn’t like. 

Of course she doesn’t like them because they’d cut into her revenue stream if they become law.  Needless to say, when it comes to lawyers’ take on shared parenting, the bottom line is always the bottom line.  It’s long past time the Florida Legislature stopped allowing this tiny special interest group to dictate so much about children’s welfare and other people’s money.

February 13, 2020 by Lynda Steele

“Sorry my organization only furnishes homes for non-custodial fathers, but I can direct you to an organization that can help you”.

Have you ever heard of an organization for only non-custodial fathers? Think about that for a minute. On a daily basis one-half of parents are turned away from certain support and resources because they are marked in family court with the title of “Non-Custodial”.  It’s as if, all of a sudden, they have been cast out by society, condemned to no support and diminished credibility in their children’s lives.

Furnishing Fatherhood came about one day when a young father reached out to me and said, “Hey I heard you help fathers. I don’t know how to ask you this, but do you by chance have a car seat? My child’s mother said she is not going to share the car seat anymore and, if I don’t have my own by my next visit, she will not let me have that weekend with my son.” Shocked, slightly irritated and now intrigued, I had a laundry list of questions. If he was missing a car seat and she wouldn’t share “hers” what else was this dad missing? 

As it turned out, this dad had absolutely nothing. Since his relationship ended, he had for a year been “couch hopping”, paying his child support and saving money for his own place. When they split up all he was “allowed” to have was a back pack of his clothes. After hearing his story, I knew he needed more than just a car seat. I went to Facebook Marketplace and created a post asking for clothing for his son, living room furniture, a bed for him and his son, kitchen appliances and dishes – anything I could think of for a home. 

Within two weeks, I not only had the car seat, but I had enough furniture for two homes. The next task was getting the items to the father and son. The company of the husband of a woman who had been helping me donated a gas card and their truck and trailer and we hauled all of the belongings two and a half hours away and completely furnished his home.

My life changed that day. 

There is no law that states a car seat has to follow a child between homes, and there is no law that says it can’t. There is no law that makes it mandatory for two parents to work together after they dissolve their relationship, nor should there be. However, the title of “Non-Custodial” should never justify treating someone as less than a parent in the eyes of their children.
Since that day I have made a commitment that my garage will always be full and I will continue furnishing homes for non-custodial fathers. As of January 2020, we have three locations, Oklahoma City, Tulsa and Lawton. We plan to open our fourth location in Pauls Valley, Oklahoma spring of 2020. If you would like to make a donation to Furnishing Fatherhood you can connect with us through our email furnishingfatherhood@gmail.com, our PO Box 94563 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma  73143 or visit us on Facebook @Furnishing Fatherhood.

Lynda Steele is the founder of Furnishing Fatherhood. They seek to help fathers who have gone through a divorce or separation furnish their homes and provide necessities so they can remain active parents in their children’s lives.

February 12, 2020 by Robert Franklin, JD, Member, National Board of Directors

In discussing parental alienation of children, I’ve many times commented on how thorny a problem allegations of PA can present to judges and custody evaluators.  In about one-third of cases in which child abuse is alleged, alienation is as well.  Imagine being a judge and having to sort out the competing claims and proffers of evidence and arrive at a decision.  There may be no abuse and no alienation or there may be both.  Or there may be alienation and not abuse or vice versa.  And all allegations are presented in the most heated rhetoric.  Sound easy?  It’s not.

Trickiest of all is the question whether a child’s rejection of a parent is justified or not.  One of the key indicators of PA isn’t simply rejection, but unjustified rejection.  So how’s a judge to figure out whether an angry and rejecting child is engaging in appropriate or inappropriate behavior?  There’s no case a judge less likes to hear than one including allegations of abuse and alienation.

Understandably, judges usually try to reach the right conclusion by resort to mental health professionals.  After all, at least they have training and experience in evaluating children’s behavior and therefore may be in a position to identify PA or its absence.  The problem with that approach is that, whatever their training and experience, making that evaluation can be hard for court-appointed evaluators too.  Indeed, complaints of wrong findings of alienation and wrong findings of no alienation are rife.

With that background, Professor Richard Warshak has published a new paper on how to avoid false positive findings of parental alienation.  To what extent those are a problem, I don’t know, but Warshak’s article, that appears in Volume 22 of the APA’s journal Psychology, Public Policy and Law, makes a valuable contribution to the growing body of science on parental alienation.

By now, that set of information is indeed impressive, as Warshak’s article makes clear.

Attention to parental alienation has significantly increased since the late 1990s. During this time, the number of trial and appellate cases in which court-appointed evaluators testified on parental alienation or in which courts determined that parental alienation was material, probative, and relevant to the case has grown considerably… There has also been an accumulation of knowledge about parental alienating behaviors and the psychology of alienated children (for a database of more than 1,300 publications, see Vanderbilt University Medical Center, n.d.), and of research on assessment instruments (Bernet, Gregory, Reay, & Rohner, 2018; Hands & Warshak, 2011; Huff, Anderson, Adamsons, & Tambling, 2017; Moné & Biringen, 2012; Row- lands, 2019a, 2019b). A review of 58 studies concluded that parental alienating behaviors and the presence of alienation in a child can be reliably identified (Saini, Johnston, Fidler, & Bala, 2016).

Compare that with, say, the assertions of the likes of law professor Joan Meier and others who seem to want us to believe that parental alienation doesn’t exist at all and the very concept is one thought up by abusive fathers to gain unwarranted time with their kids.  A great many scrupulous researchers have produced more than enough science to make the claims of Meier, et al little but an entertaining sideshow to the real event.  The battle to elbow the problem of parental alienation aside is over.  Meier, et al, should take heed.

Meanwhile, Warshak’s new paper constitutes a hallmark in the maturation of the subject.  Only professionals who are sure of their expertise could take on the problem of false positives, secure in the knowledge that discussing the issue and the issue itself will not endanger acceptance of PA by mental health professionals or the legal profession.  Meier and her fellow travelers may be tempted to seize on Warshak’s work to further criticize findings of alienation.  After all, if false positive findings of PA exist, then perhaps all findings of PA are false, right?  I know that would be an unprincipled take Warshak’s paper, but, as we know, Meier is not above unprincipled and even outright false claims.

So Warshak’s right to caution both custody evaluators and judges about the danger of false positives.  He points out that just because certain alienating behavior (e.g. bad-mouthing the other parent) exists on the part of a parent doesn’t mean that the intention or the result is an alienated child.  In the throes of divorce, parents are far from their best selves and sometimes unduly criticize the other parent.  That’s common, far more common than alienation.

When compared with a child whose negative behavior does not reflect parental alienation, a child with moderate or severe parental alienation displays negative behavior that meets all of the following criteria.

1. The behavior is chronic rather than temporary and short lived (but can include an ongoing pattern of intermittent alienation that recedes in the presence of the rejected parent but returns when in the presence of the favored parent).
2. The behavior is frequent rather than occasional.
3. The behavior occurs in most situations rather than only in certain situations.
4. The behavior occurs without displays of genuine love and affection toward the rejected parent.
5. The behavior is directed at only one parent.
6. The behavior does not reflect typical dynamics for the child’s stage of development.
7. The behavior is disproportionate to, and not justified by the rejected parent’s past or current behavior.

Likewise, a child who criticizes a parent, even unjustifiably, isn’t necessary alienated.  There are many other possible explanations for his/her behavior that must be explored and assessed by the mental health professional tasked with rendering an opinion to the court.

Examples of situations in which children treat a parent negatively but their behavior does not meet the seven criteria [for parental alienation] are: (a) normal reactions to parental separation; (b) behavior reflecting a difficult temperament or emotional problems; (c) reluctance to leave a parent who needs emotional support; (d) situation-specific resistance to being with a parent; (e)feeling closer to or having more rapport with one parent; (f) feeling more comfortable in one’s parent’s home, either because of differences in parenting styles or in the emotional atmosphere of the home; and (g) typical adolescent psychological functioning. In each of these situations, a child’s negative behavior can be mistaken for parental alienation.

Dr. Warshak’s work extends the range of both the science of parental alienation and its accurate and scrupulous use in court.  The science on parental alienation is expanding and will continue to do so because parents continue to engage in the practice.  The better we understand PA, the better for all concerned and Warshak’s latest is a significant step in that direction.

February 10, 2020 by Robert Franklin, JD, Member, National Board of Directors

NPO’s shared parenting bill has passed the state Senate by a whopping 39 – 1 margin.  Here’s SB 157 in its amended form.

The key language of course is,

(2) In making an order for a temporary parenting plan, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for fit, willing and able parents to have temporary joint legal custody and share equally in parenting time.

The bill only applies to temporary orders, but that’s a good thing for two reasons.  First, the custody arrangement during the pendency of the divorce case can easily become the arrangement afterward.  Temporary orders have a way of becoming permanent. 

Second, as we saw in Kentucky three years ago, once the legislature passes a shared parenting bill that applies to temporary orders, it becomes easier the following session to pass one for permanent orders.  Temporary orders get the camel’s nose under the tent and, once in, it’s only a matter of time before the beast is all the way inside.

Now of course the bill goes to the House.

It’s not a perfect bill, but few are.  The main danger to shared parenting comes here:

(1) If there is presentation of documentation or other information by a parent that would support a finding of good cause that domestic abuse has occurred or is occurring, there shall be a presumption that it is not in the best interests of the child for the parents to have temporary joint legal custody and share equally in parenting time.

That’s scandalously (unconstitutionally?) vague language that can mean practically anything.  Notice for example that the section says nothing about evidence, so apparently, none of the “documentation” or “information” need be admissible in a court of law.  That opens the door to, well, anything anyone wants to toss up on the judge’s desk.  Likewise, the words “would support a finding” are subject to a wide array of interpretations.  What, for example, is the quantum of evidence required before such a finding can be made?  The section is silent.  Again, the bill offers no guidance to judges about what they can or can’t do when an allegation of DV is made.

And then there’s “has occurred.”  What if Dad pushed Mom 25 years before the filing of the divorce petition.  Is the presumption of equal parenting reversed?  It seems that it would be, because, after all, domestic abuse “has occurred.”

Needless to say, Section 1 wasn’t drafted by NPO’s people in Kansas.  The House should draft its own version of the Senate bill and drastically alter Section (c)(1).  As that section stands, it’s an open invitation to abuse by anti-shared parenting judges and litigants.

The better news is that, in very few cases is there a claim of domestic violence.  That was the finding in Nebraska by Saini, et al who, at the request of the legislature there, reviewed about 400 child custody cases over several years.  Only about 5% of cases even alleged DV and I suspect much the same holds true in Kansas.

Of course, if the bill is enacted into law with Section (c)(1) intact, the incidence of DV allegations may rise.  Any lawyer reading those words would instantly realize that they give a parent an almost automatic “out” from the shared parenting presumption.

Still, the low level of DV allegations, plus the presumption of equal parenting time hold out real hope for dramatic change in how custody decisions are made in Kansas.  Needless to say, NPO will be vigorously lobbying the House for passage of a bill that presumes equal parenting time and includes a sensible section on domestic violence.

February 7, 2020 by Robert Franklin, JD, Member, National Board of Directors

This article gives a pretty good idea of the dysfunctional nature of the child support system in the United States (Kansas City Star, 1/26/20).  The state in question is Missouri, but the issues are the same from sea to shining sea and beyond.

Case in point: that of Rebecca Greenwell.  Back in 2001, she was ordered to pay child support for her two kids.  She did for almost five years, but then experienced health problems (emphysema and herniated spinal discs) that severely limited her ability to work and earn.  The state’s solution?  Put her in jail.  Of course that didn’t help her pay, nor did it improve her health, so Greenwell plunged further and further into debt.

So the latest threat against her is a six-month stretch in jail, a prospect Greenwall understandably dreads.  But she probably won’t go inside again.  Why?  Because her daughter, who’s now 20 years old, pays the child support for her.  That’s right, the daughter for whom she owes the support in the first place is paying it for her mother.  Amazing, but true.

Now, what the article doesn’t mention is that other versions of Greenwell’s case are actually fairly common.  It’s true that the payor isn’t usually the child for whom the support is intended, but the fact remains that, when a parent is faced with jail, others often step up to make sure that doesn’t happen.  So, relatives, friends or neighbors often pitch in to pay child support they don’t owe, just to keep the state from jailing a parent who’s too poor to pay.

And, speaking of the poor, that’s who typically fall under the State of Missouri’s axe in child support court.  That’s not surprising, given that the same is true throughout the country and, as elsewhere, in Missouri, the poor don’t get much of a day in court when they fall behind on their payments.

“We have people who are clearly indigent, clearly insolvent, in prison solely for not paying child support,” said Matthew Mueller, special public defender for the Missouri State Public Defender system. “We need to ask ourselves whether we as a state, as citizens of Missouri, believe it’s appropriate or fair to be sending poor people to prison solely for not paying child support.”…

“I really have an issue with criminalizing poor people for not paying their child support because it’s not that they are choosing not to pay, it’s they really just don’t have the resources to pay it,” district defender Shayla Marshall said…

“The state cannot penalize someone just for being poor,” said Phil Telfeyan, executive director at Equal Justice Under Law, which has litigated the issue in five states.

“We think the vast majority of the 40,000 suspensions are people who literally cannot afford to make the payments. We’re not dealing with people who are refusing to pay and they have money hidden away somewhere.”

As the Office of Child Support Enforcement has announced numerous times, the overwhelming majority of child support debtors report earning under $10,000 per year.  That, together with the fact that support orders are routinely set at levels above which obligors can pay, mean that the child support enforcement system comes down hardest on the poor and those unable to pay.

Plus,

State Sen. Karla May said she is confident the law on driver’s license suspensions can be amended this legislative session.

The St. Louis Democrat is sponsoring a bill that would allow evidence to be presented at suspension hearings, and for judges to make decisions based on a person’s ability to pay child support as well as their transportation needs.

“Right now they don’t have that option,” May said. “Basically when they come into the court, it’s just a quick procedure and they suspend the license right away and they can’t go into discussion.”

To me, that looks like a procedure of dubious constitutionality.  When a state senator says that the current system doesn’t allow the production of evidence (apparently any evidence), it strongly suggests that the debtor isn’t permitted to show indigency.  Of course, license suspension is different from incarceration, but a state’s refusal to hear evidence from the debtor can’t satisfy the requirements of due process of law.  Can it?

Meanwhile, Republican office holders have weighed in on the need for reform.  Senator Wayne Wallingford told NPO:

Conservatives believe a limited government includes the protection of children.  While we should end the punitive practice of suspending licenses when there is an inability to pay, my values dictate that we should also ensure children receive the care that they fundamentally require.  I’m sure we can come up with bipartisan support on this.

There are a few efforts afoot in the Missouri Legislature to make the system less draconian than it currently is, but they’re mostly rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.  The system of ordering and enforcing child support is not only dysfunctional, but in many ways divorced from the realities of what it takes to raise a child and how much should be ordered. 

In the not too distant future, the National Parents Organization will be producing a comprehensive report on child support that should form the basis for the type of wholesale, root-and-branch reform that’s long been needed.

February 6, 2020 by Robert Franklin, Member, National Board of Directors

I’ve written many times about the tendency of child protective authorities to overreach, i.e. to intervene in families when doing so isn’t warranted by the situation.  Last time I wrote about the case of Dr. John Cox who, despite over a dozen doctors saying he hadn’t injured his infant daughter, has had the child taken from him and his wife and now faces felony child abuse charges.  Key to the child’s removal by the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families were the opinions “child abuse pediatricians,” a small but growing set of medical specialists whose very existence is troubling to many.  Dr. Cox’s case looks like a good example of why and NBC and the Houston Chronicle have publicized several others.

But even those who believe that the current approach to child protection is, on balance, doing its job well, would have to admit that the use of child abuse doctors has its disturbing downsides.  In my last post, mentioned the tendency to exacerbate overreach and the problem with conflicts of interest, but there’s another problem.

Cox’s ordeal has also opened a rift at Children’s Wisconsin, where some treating physicians say they are so alarmed by what’s happened to him that they now hesitate to refer injured children for evaluations by child abuse pediatricians, fearing that an abuse specialist might jump to the wrong conclusion and needlessly report parents to Child Protective Services. 

In other words, the existence and nature of child abuse doctors sometimes causes other doctors to avoid their input into cases of injured children.  Surely that’s not the result child protective officials would want, but it’s the one their interactions with child abuse doctors has produced.  After all, Dr. Cox put the matter succinctly when he said,

“In hindsight,” Cox said in a recent interview, “taking her to our own hospital was the single most harmful decision that we made for our baby.”

Indeed.  The more state officials are determined to find abuse where there is none, the more people will refrain from contacting them, even people like doctors who are required by law to do so.

My guess is that that tendency extends to parents generally, at least somewhat.  After all, CPS agencies’ willingness to overreach, to take children from parents when it’s not necessary, is well-known and getting more so.  News reports of that abound.  If you’re a parent with an injured child and if the injury doesn’t appear too serious, what would you do?  Would you take little Andy or Jenny to the ER and risk the “mandated reporters” there bringing in CPS caseworkers?  It wouldn’t be surprising if we learned that parents consider exactly those risks and keep the child out of the hands of those mandated reporters if possible.

The child abuse pediatrician quoted by the NBC News article, Dr. Lynn Sheets, makes some quite dubious claims for the behavior of her fellow specialists.

Her 2013 research into these “sentinel injuries” — a term she coined and popularized — found that nearly a third of seriously abused children had previously suffered minor injuries, such as bruises.

To which I can only ask “So what?”  I’m surprised that only one-third of those kids had minor injuries.  Face it, kids fall down, they toddle into furniture, the cat swats them, they tumble off chairs.  Of course they had minor injuries.  Didn’t we all?  But Sheets indulges in a logical fallacy.  Even if 100% of abused kids had minor injuries prior to their abuse, that doesn’t mean that every minor injury either indicates or is a precursor to intentional harm.  Sheets seems not to grasp that elementary fact.

She goes on.

“One of the things we realized is, if you just call it a bruise, everyone has bruises,” Sheets told The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel last year, after the bill was introduced. “Everyone thinks about it as a minor injury, including the doctors, including child welfare. So we needed to change the way people are thinking about these minor injuries in young infants.”

Oh?  Why do “we” need to do that?  Minor injuries are just that and every kid has them.  What Sheets apparently hasn’t done (I suspect because she can’t) is demonstrate some robust correlation between minor injuries and future abuse.  If she can do so convincingly, she may have a point, but until then, she doesn’t.

Meanwhile, others are examining the devastating consequences of looking for abuse where none has occurred.

But some doctors, defense lawyers and parental rights advocates have criticized the effort to redefine minor injuries as beacons of future danger. They warn that it opens the door for increased prosecutions of innocent families, especially people of color, who are more likely to be flagged as abuse suspects, and parents of children with rare disorders that predispose them to bruising.

It’s what I and many others have been warning about for years.  The strong tendency of child protective agencies to overreach can only be exacerbated by the existence of child abuse pediatricians.  And the point can’t be stressed strongly enough: taking children from parents who’ve done nothing wrong is not a victimless crime.  Children are terribly traumatized and so are parents.  Parents may be forced to spend huge sums of money just to legally regain the care of their child they shouldn’t have lost in the first place.  And whatever trust the general public has in agencies of government is further eroded.

Dr. Cox’s case is an excellent example.  He and his wife, who’s also a doctor, are intelligent, highly-educated and at least reasonably affluent people.  If this travesty can happen to them, it can happen to anyone.  The poor and undereducated don’t stand a chance.

February 4, 2020

A video-taped symposium on ‘Reducing Parental Conflict and Harm to Children’ was held last week at the Connecticut Legislature.

The first invited speaker was Professor Martin Kulldorff at Harvard Medical School, who talked about the ‘Scientific Evidence on Shared Parenting’ (video @32:00). Based on a review paper by Dr. Linda Nielsen, he presented the scientific evidence that shared parenting is in the best interest of the great majority of children, in terms of mental health, physical health, behavior and inter-personal relationships. From tables containing effect estimates from each outcome in each study, there were overwhelming evidence that shared parenting is better, and for some outcomes, the differences were surprisingly large. He concluded that there is a family court paradox between (i) the best interest of the child principle, (ii) the scientific evidence that shared parenting is in the best interest of the vast majority of children, and (iii) the fact that only a minority of children live in a shared custody arrangement. Dr. Kulldorff ended his presentation stating that if shared parenting was a medical drug, it would easily be approved by the FDA for its mental health benefits and the pharmaceutical company would make billons from it.

The second speaker was Professor Emily Douglas from Worcester Polytechnical Institute, one of the nations’ leading experts on child abuse and other forms of domestic violence (@54:20). She spoke about ‘Stepping Out of the Shadows: Men’s Experiences with Partner Violence Victimization and Recent Efforts to Meet their Needs’. She explained that somewhere between 20-50% of adult domestic abuse victims are men, but that their support system is less developed than for women. While some men have positive experience receiving help from medical professionals, domestic abuse agencies, hotlines and the police, other men described how their cry for help where summarily dismissed and disbelieved. Dr. Douglas also discussed legal aggression as a form of domestic abuse as well as the negative effect on children when witnessing domestic abuse.

University of Connecticut professor emeritus John Clapp was the third speaker, basing his talk on the Hollywood portrayal of divorce in the recent ‘Marriage Story’ movie (@1:40:20). He cited the movie review by New York Times, which stated that custody battles require parents ‘to participate in a legal process that is artificial and estranging by nature, calling on them to make cartoon villains of each other’. He then asked if that was an accurate description of divorce in Connecticut. Dr. Clapp contrasted Connecticut with Sweden, where divorce is less contentious as the parents are told that absent abuse, it is ‘highly unlikely’ that the outcome in court will be anything other than equal-time shared parenting.

The last speaker was an experienced divorce mediator, Colleen O’Neill, who spoke on ‘Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Divorce’ (@1:54:00). After first describing her own personal experiences, she outlined the short- and long-term benefits of mediation, for both the parents and children. She also spoke about the need for professionals to have mental health training to make family assessments during divorce proceedings.

The symposium ended with comments and questions from the audience. Responding to one question concerning the financial impact of shared parenting on the state (@2:34:00), all panel members agreed that it would save money for Connecticut tax payers; in court, school and health related expenditures.

With help from NPO, this symposium was organized by the Shared Parenting Council of Connecticut (SPC). NPO and SPC are planning additional activities in the state, and if you are interested in joining the important efforts for shared parenting and against domestic abuse in Connecticut, please contact the NPO national office. We will then put you in contact with the right people.

February 4, 2020 by Robert Franklin, JD, Member, National Board of Directors

This excellent article is the latest in a series by NBC News and (sometimes) the Houston Chronicle (NBC News, 1/27/20).  The series deals with the rising “specialty” of child abuse physicians, i.e. those who are supposedly uniquely trained and qualified to diagnose intentional injuries to children.  Those physicians don’t necessarily have a conflict of interest, but, as the article demonstrates, they often seem to adopt one.  Plus, as the NBC piece also makes clear, the very existence of the specialty can produce other more sinister ethical violations.

The piece is long and too detailed to adequately describe here.  Suffice it to say, that Dr. John Cox, an ER physician and his wife, Dr. Sadie Dombrozsi, an oncologist and hematologist, were in the process of adopting a baby girl.  They’d already adopted two boys and appear to have been entirely loving and fit parents to them.  But, not long after they’d brought home their one-month-old daughter-to-be, Cox fell asleep with the baby beside him.  When he awoke, he was partially on top of her.  The child was in no distress, but Cox was concerned.  He called his wife who was out of town with the boys and together they decided to “err on the side of caution” and take the baby to Children’s Wisconsin hospital at which they both worked.

As events developed, that turned out to be the least cautious thing they could have done.  Months later, the baby has been taken from them by the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families and John is under felony indictment for child abuse.  The latter of course threatens not only his freedom, but his livelihood.  That is all true despite the fact that there is no clear evidence of abuse, the pair have always been good parents to their other children and numerous doctors have looked into the case and found no reason to believe abuse occurred.

What followed, according to more than 15 medical experts who later reviewed Cox’s case, was a series of medical mistakes and misstatements by hospital staff members that has devastated Cox’s family and derailed his career. A nurse practitioner on the hospital’s child abuse team confused the baby’s birthmarks for bruises, according to seven dermatologists who have reviewed the case. A child abuse pediatrician misinterpreted a crucial blood test, four hematologists later said. Then, two weeks after the incident, armed with those disputed medical reports, Child Protective Services took the child. 

Actually, that recap of the problems in the case seriously understates the doggedness with which child abuse specialists, a nurse practitioner and others, and caseworkers with the WDCF credited medical interpretations that concluded abuse had occurred and ignored those saying otherwise.  That’s a process that one independent medical expert, orthopedist Dr. Matthew Wichman called “quite preposterous.”

But it’s worse than that, far worse.  On several occasions, child abuse pediatricians at Children’s Wisconsin have apparently attempted to get doctors to falsify medical records to enhance the state’s possibility of securing a court order to remove a child from its parents.  Needless to say, that’s an outrageous breech of medical ethics that warrants discipline by the appropriate licensing agency, if proved.

A dozen members of the hospital’s medical staff spoke to a reporter on the condition of anonymity, worried that they would be punished for discussing their concerns publicly.

Several emergency room doctors described an “out of control” child abuse team that is too quick to report minor injuries to authorities and that is too closely aligned with state child welfare investigators. Three of the doctors recalled being pressured by child abuse pediatricians to alter medical records, removing passages where they had initially reported having little or no concerns about abuse, though there’s no evidence that happened in Cox’s case.

“Essentially they’ve asked us to edit medical records to help the state prosecute parents,” one doctor said. “It’s completely inappropriate.”

It also shows what’s perhaps the most important takeaway from this and other cases involving child abuse doctors – their tendency to become less doctors caring for young patients than advocates for state child protective agencies.  Obviously, the line between the two can be unclear, but when a doctor’s title and job description involve seeking out abuse, the tendency to find that abuse where others haven’t increases.

For example, several staff members told a reporter that child abuse pediatricians at the hospital routinely review medical records of children who’ve been admitted to the ER — even when no doctor has asked for their opinion — and then weigh in on whether Child Protective Services should be called. Sometimes child abuse specialists send notes scolding ER physicians for failing to flag children, even though those physicians did not believe the child had been abused, several doctors said.

Plus, as I and others have said before, parents trying to deal with an injured child, who take that child to a hospital and are confronted with a welter of doctors, nurses, administrators, etc. may well not be aware of the child abuse doctor’s dual role, i.e. that of caregiver to the child and potential adversary to the parents.  Needless to say, that conflict of interest may not be disclosed at all and certainly not in the early going.

I’ll say more about this next time.